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I. UTAH LAW REQUIRES PLAINTIFFS TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES. 
A. Article XIII, Section 11(5) Unambiguously Requires 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 
Article XIII, Section 11(5) is clear in what it 
authorizes the Legislature to do. It states. 
Notwithstanding the powers granted to the State 
Tax Commission in this Constitution, the 
Legislature may authorize any court established 
under Article VIII to adjudicate, review, 
reconsider, or redetermine any matter decided by 
the State Tax Commission or by a County Board of 
Equalization relating to revenue and taxation as 
provided by statute. 
Under this provision, the Legislature may authorize courts 
to review "matters decided" by the Tax Commission. Once a 
taxpayer has exhausted his administrative remedies and the 
matter has been decided by the Commission, the courts may 
then "review, reconsider, or redetermine" that matter in the 
manner the Legislature, by statute has provided. 
The history behind the Amendment repeatedly refers to 
the district court "reviewing" tax commission decisions, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (2000), was passed with that 
intent. Pis.' Br., Exh. 5. Plaintiffs contend that 
exhaustion is excusable because this section was an 
expansion of the powers of the district court. Pis.' Br. at 
24. Article XIII, Section 11(5) grants the Legislature 
1 
power to determine the manner in which judicial review of 
Tax Commission decisions is to be made; it did not, by its 
own terms grant any authority directly to the district 
courts to hear matters committed to the supervision and 
administration of the Tax Commission. 
B. District Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Excuse 
Exhaustion Except in Exceptional, Limited 
Circumstances. 
Plaintiffs list several situations where they contend 
the district court may exercise jurisdiction. Pis.' Br. at 
24-26. The only relevant1 situation cited is challenging 
the validity of a Tax Commission rule under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46a-12.1 (1997) of the Rulemaking Act. The other 
situations cited involve statutory review mechanisms for 
property taxes or transitory personal property taxes, which 
are not at issue here. Many of the cases do not involve the 
Tax Commission at all. Most of the decisions pre-dated the 
adoption of the Administrative Procedures Act, and all but 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 1999 UT 41, 
1
 The constitutional amendment was not self-executing, 
therefore those statutes providing for district court review 
which were passed prior to the constitutional grant of 
authority given in the amendment may be of questionable 
validity. However, since the only section relevant to the 
issue presented here is § 63-46a-12.1 the Court need not 
address the validity of the other sections cited. 
2 
979 P.2d 346, pre-date the decision of this court in Evans & 
Sutherland v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435 (Utah 
1997), and the subsequent adoption of Article XIII, Section 
11(5) of the Constitution, which is controlling in the 
question presented in the instant case. While Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-301 (2000) may establish a limited exception, it 
does not apply in this matter. Plaintiffs have not alleged 
to have paid the tax in question under protest or complied 
with the other requirements of that section. 
Plaintiffs' reference to the limited exception 
established by this court in Brumley v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 868 P.2d 796 (Utah 1993), does not apply in this 
matter for reasons to be discussed at length in Section D. 
The only applicable grounds cited by the Plaintiffs come 
under the Utah Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1. 
To the extent that section would excuse exhaustion, it is 
inconsistent with Article XIII Section 11(5), which only 
allows review of matters decided by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. 
C. Plaintiffs7 Reliance on Salt Lake City Corp, v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n is Misplaced. 
In its brief, Plaintiffs liken the case at bar to Salt 
Lake City Corp., wherein this Court maintained that under 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1, district courts may exercise 
traditional appellate jurisdiction in accordance with the 
Constitution. 1999 UT 41, at ^20. Plaintiffs contend that 
u[t]his case, therefore, involves nothing more than 
traditional appellate judicial review ..." Pis.' Br. at 23. 
This case has no similarities to "traditional appellate 
review." No original proceeding or action was ever 
instituted from which the district court could exercise 
"traditional appellate review" on appeal. The Tax 
Commission has never been given the opportunity to consider 
the claims made by these taxpayers. The fact that the 
Rulemaking Act prescribes specific processes for review of 
agency rules, which Plaintiffs have not complied with, 
underscores the fact that the Tax Commission has not had a 
chance to consider Plaintiffs' position on these issues. 
Indeed, in the Salt Lake City Corp. case that Plaintiffs 
rely on, the city first filed a petition for a rule change 
with the Tax Commission and appealed to the district court 
after its request was denied. 1999 UT 41, at ^4-6. Salt 
Lake City Corp. did not address, or decide the issue 
presented here, whether exhaustion may be excused under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1. 
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D. The Narrow Exception Recognized in Brumley is Not 
Relevant to this Matter. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Brumley is in error because 
Brumley is inapposite to the case at bar. Brumley 
recognized a limited exception to the original jurisdiction 
of the Tax Commission. This exception is limited to 
threshold constitutional issues, the determination of which, 
"could not have been avoided by any turn the case might have 
taken in the Commission." Brumley, 868 P.2d at 799. This 
exception is consistent with the Constitution since the 
district court would not invade the core prerogatives of the 
Commission by determining the constitutional issue. Id. 
Therefore, Brumley limits the district court review to the 
constitutional issue. After deciding the threshold legal 
issue, the district court must remand to the Tax Commission 
for further proceedings consistent with the court's 
decision. Id. 
While Brumley may excuse exhaustion in the limited 
circumstance where the Commission cannot resolve a 
constitutional issue, it would not excuse exhaustion in this 
matter. The issues Plaintiffs raise are simple questions 
regarding the application of the tax laws of the state. The 
Tax Commission addresses such questions on a regular basis. 
5 
It has both the authority and constitutional responsibility 
to make these types of determinations. The questions 
presented do not challenge the "Commission's very authority 
to act," Bluth v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 Ut. App. 138, 
1(7, 26 P. 3d 882, 884, they simply require the application of 
existing law to a specific set of facts. The Tax Commission 
has jurisdiction to make all determinations, factual and 
legal, as to whether the rules apply in this instance as 
well as whether the tax has been properly imposed. These 
matters do not present any constitutional questions, let 
alone a "threshold constitutional issue that cannot be 
avoided." Therefore this case does not fit under the narrow 
exception to exhaustion set forth in Brumley. 
In this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies is 
required before the district court may exercise 
jurisdiction. To fail to require exhaustion would impinge 
on the "core functions" of the Tax Commission and would 
therefore be prohibited. Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 
443; Brumley, 868 P.2d at 799. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXCUSING EXHAUSTION. 
A. The Court of Appeals Applied the Wrong Standard. 
Assuming for purpose of argument, that exhaustion may 
6 
be excused under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1, the 
exceptions to exhaustion under the Rulemaking Act are 
limited to the express provisions of the act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1(2)(b) (1997). Plaintiffs argue that they 
need not exhaust administrative remedies "wb^n it would 
serve 'no useful purpose' or be 'futile and useless' to do 
so." Pis.' Br. at 34, & note 6. Under the Rulemaking Act, 
an individual challenging a rule is limited to the 
exceptions prescribed by the Legislature. Since Article 
XIII dictates that Tax Commission decisions be reviewed "as 
provided by statute" the application of judicially created 
exceptions to exhaustion in this instance would be a 
violation of the separation of powers prescribed in Article 
V of the Utah Constitution. 
B. Plaintiffs Would Not Suffer Irreparable Harm if 
Forced to Bring an Action Challenging the Rules 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12. 
Plaintiffs in their brief properly identify the issue 
as "whether compliance with § 63-46a-12 would cause 
irreparable harm to Plaintiffs . . . ." (Plaintiff's Brief, 
p.43) The reasoning of the Court of Appeals' Opinion does 
not support the conclusion that Plaintiffs would suffer 
irreparable harm if forced to comply with the statutory 
7 
requirements of § 63-46a-12.1 and bring an action 
challenging the rule pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12. 
The Court of Appeals' reasoning that a "facial 
challenge" to the rule would be "futile and useless" not 
only applies the wrong legal standard, but misapprehends 
both the facts and the law. Plaintiffs' challenges to the 
rules in question were clearly stated as as-applied 
challenges. Plaintiffs' complaint repeatedly challenge the 
rules uas interpreted by the Commission" See, Pis.' Compl. 
at ^23. 
Also as pointed out in the Tax Commission's Initial 
Brief, bringing a challenge, even a facial one, to a 
Commission rule would not be futile or useless since the 
Commission has full authority to repeal, alter or amend its 
rules. Initial Br. of Tax Comm'n at 31. 
Nowhere in Plaintiffs' briefs or in the Court of 
Appeals' Opinion are there any findings that would justify 
the conclusion that bringing a simple action before the Tax 
Commission to obtain a ruling on the validity or 
applicability of the Tax Commission rules to the situation 
presented by Plaintiff's facts would cause them irreparable 
harm. The arguments made by Plaintiffs as well as the 
8 
justifications made by the Court of Appeals often rely on 
the claim for tax refund in discussing their justifications 
for failure to exhaust. However, an action under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-12 is not a refund action. First, that 
section is a general provision found in the administrative 
procedures act applicable to actions before all agencies. 
By its own terms it states "an interested person may 
petition an agency requesting the making, amendment, or 
repeal of a rule." 
This section on its face does not authorize the agency 
to do anything other than rule on whether the requested rule 
should be made, amended, or repealed. There is nothing that 
would require Plaintiffs to combine this action with a claim 
for refund filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110. 
Therefore, the arguments of Plaintiffs and justifications of 
the Court of Appeals dealing with the refund claim are not 
germane to analysis of whether irreparable harm would be 
incurred by filing an action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46a-12. Plaintiffs would suffer no harm, let alone 
irreparable harm, if required to follow the statutory 
mandate to bring such an action. 
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C. Plaintiff's Arguments Relating to their Claim for 
Refund do not Justify a Finding of Irreparable 
Harm, 
As set forth above, the arguments of Plaintiff that are 
dependent upon an analysis of their claim for refund are not 
germane to the question presented. However, an analysis of 
those arguments also fails to sustain a finding of 
"irreparable harm." The Court of Appeals cited the de 
minimus amount of each refund request as a justification for 
excusing exhaustion. This reasoning is flawed in several 
respects. First, the Tax Commission has ability to provide 
full relief to taxpayers who can demonstrate that they have 
wrongfully paid sales tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110 
(2000). In proceedings before the Tax Commission, taxpayers 
receive all the protection they would otherwise receive 
before the district court. Taxpayers are entitled to 
representation, notice, and discovery before the Commission, 
and the Commission can subpoena witnesses to enable them to 
fully consider the evidence involved. Utah Admin. Code 
R861-1A-26. The Tax Commission can conduct a hearing and 
provide a refund where appropriate, all of which is done in 
a timely manner, with little or no cost to the taxpayer. 
There is no filing fee, and no requirement to be represented 
10 
by counsel. No form is required to file a claim. All that 
is required is a letter from the taxpayer outlining the 
basis for the claim and providing any documentation they may 
have. Any Tax Commission action on the claim would then be 
subject to review by the courts. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
would not be denied their day in court if they first sought 
to exhaust their remedies before the Tax Commission, as the 
Constitution requires. The Tax Commission is uniquely 
suited to handling large numbers of relatively small claims 
by pro se filers in a fair, fast and efficient manner. 
Handling such claims is clearly within the ucore functions" 
of the Commission. 
A taxpayer who voluntarily chooses to forgo this remedy 
cannot be deemed to have suffered "irreparable harm." Any 
expense and inconvenience involved in an administrative 
hearing does not constitute irreparable harm, 
disproportionate to the public benefit gained by requiring 
the administrative determination. Williams Gas Pipelines 
Cent., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 7 P.3d 311, 316 (Kan. 
App. 2000) . 
D. Money Damages Do Not Constitute Irreparable Harm. 
Even if the refund claim were deemed relevant to the 
11 
analysis of whether the Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable 
harm if forced to exhaust pursuant to § 63-46a-12.1 the fact 
that any potential "injury" can be calculated to a precise 
dollar amount proves that the harm could be repaired. The 
person could be made whole through the payment of money. 
Where damages are identifiable and entirely compensable in 
money, they are not the sort of damages that would support a 
finding of irreparable injury or harm. Systems Concepts, 
Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs contend that irreparable harm is distinct 
from the idea of irreparable injury as defined by this Court 
in Systems Concepts. Id. The standards of irreparable harm 
and irreparable injury are regularly intertwined and treated 
as the same. .See, e.g., Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int'l 
Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001); American 
Financial Services Ass'n v. Burke, 169 F.Supp.2d 62, 69 (D. 
Conn. 2001). Courts have regularly held that' irreparable 
harm does not exist when the alleged harm can be readily 
satisfied with ascertainable monetary damages. See, e.g., 
American Music Co. v. Higbee, 961 P.2d 108, 112 (Mont. 
1998); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Int'l Union v. 
Earle Industries, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Ark. 1994); 
12 
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refund recipient against the Tax Commission's database of 
individuals who owe taxes. If the individual applying for a 
refund is found to have an outstanding debt to the Tax 
Commission, the statute requires that the refund amount be 
applied to the outstanding debt and only the balance 
refunded to the taxpayer. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
110 (1) (a) (i) (2000) . 
Therefore, the possibility of a counterclaim has 
absolutely no relevance to Plaintiffs' duty to exhaust 
administrative remedies by bringing a claim before the Tax 
Commission challenging the rule. It comes into play only 
with regard to a claim for refund and only if that claim for 
refund proceeds in the District Court rather than the Tax 
Commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 was adopted prior to the 
constitutional amendment to Article XIII, and to the extent 
it is inconsistent with that amendment, it is invalid. As 
previously argued, exhaustion may not be excused under the 
language of Article XIII. Assuming for purposes of argument 
that that section could validly excuse exhaustion, that 
section excuses exhaustion only upon a showing of 
irreparable harm. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-
14 
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Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
110 (2) (f) (2000) . 
The District Court may review decisions on refund 
claims only as provided by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
601 (2000). It has no authority to authorize refunds 
pursuant to the Administrative Rulemaking Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46a-12.1 (1997). 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-704 Prohibits Suits to 
Restrain Tax Collection. 
Not only does the Rulemaking Act not provide for 
ordering tax refunds, but Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-704(1) 
(2000), would prohibit this action if characterized as a 
declaratory action to restrain the collection of tax. It 
states: 
Except as otherwise provided ... no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax, penalty, or interest 
imposed under Chapter 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, or 12 may be 
maintained in any court by any person, whether or 
not such person is the person against whom such 
tax was assessed. 
Under this statute, the legislature has established that tax 
refunds may only be pursued in the manner it has 
specifically provided under the tax code. This section 
precludes original actions in the district court that would 
have the effect of restraining the assessment or collection 
16 
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o* - • j / d U i i i ^ -LjxLeriiiouixtcij.il i jXpicbb \ . . JLctn S t a t e 
Tax Comm'n, U6 P. 2-1 v.4.9 i.Utah 135"\ . '.r.e district couri o 
j , . : . ax matter may not exceed ti lis 
limitation -**i iihout inf rinqin": ^a the separation oi powei F: 
A claim ror a tax refund must originate with the Tax 
C omm i s s i c r t: a 11 1 1 < ::: •: <: o u i f " ,s 
jurisdiction under 3 63--46a-1J, I is lmiiM- : bv its own 
terms - : iiicrr*: court a 
jurisdictional basis to grant the lelief sought, a tax 
refund. 
v„ .. . . , •_. J_ .•. l o u r i Lacj- i 
C l a s s f o r a Tax R e f u n d . 
L h e u b r i . e f , P l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t t -ha t t h e y s h o u l d b e 
a l l o w e d t o main* - ' ; • • - •-.- :.-. :;•* 
provides the only available avenue foi relief ... . 
:. ii,-..--e procedures 
which provide an adequate remedy as set forth above, but the 
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district court does not have authority to certify a class in 
a sales tax refund case.2 
Class actions for tax refunds are barred under the 
principle of sovereign immunity. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
(1997) states, "Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for 
any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental 
function..." Actions against the state are limited, 
therefore, to cases where the legislature has waived 
immunity. In cases seeking tax refunds, the state's 
immunity has been waived only in conformity with the 
remedies provided in Title 59. See, Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
704 (2000) . While the legislature does allow taxpayers to 
seek tax refunds, refund mechanisms provided in the tax code 
are the exclusive method for seeking redress from a tax 
assessment. See, Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 316 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1957). The 
legislature has not passed any law allowing taxpayers to 
2
 Issues relating to class certification were not 
presented below but were raised by Plaintiffs in their brief 
in support of their claim of jurisdiction, therefore, the 
Tax Commission feels compelled to respond. The response is 
limited to the jurisdictional question and does not address 
the Commission's arguments that class certification would 
not meet rule 23 requirements. 
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seek tax refunds as a class. 
Just as the legislature has not created a vehicle for 
(
 " ' - * '
 :
 " • j.*.' :..'.;- -c b y 
Plaintiffs do not establish surh * right. Neither 03 son v^ 
Salt Lake City School Dist. , -4 t . ,,a 960 (U^ah 7 9-. •
 : 
Utah Rest. Ass1 iMvis„.^t\_ _.BiL„ i>L ;i^-i • ) 
(Utah 1985 .-iv :ivc : t. he Tax Commission and the statutoi / 
1
 '-
Ti •"- i i •• ^  ' : I D I uiiii c;y J -..• : : 
)wer courr: decision that a class could rnjntain a 
;-- . r; i ^  ..- •<_• - ... ..... :-:.i:giii^  une constitutionality of a 
state statute, it required class members to foil -v.- i~-~i 
statutory refund procedure by filing individual claims with 
the Tax Coram.] s s :i : i i -A.—-,- j. ; 
• decide the const I \ ut. ; • :ii.^  1 questions for rhe class, but 
ai 1} ' i efi ii id d e t e ] : t t: i i i lati < DI is \ vrer e control ] ed by the income tax 
refund statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-529. Brumley. 868 
.. ; .-:i ^ - .ic legislature extended the 3-year period for 
f i 1 i ng c 1 aims under that sect ioi. i 
tile claims with the Tax CommissiOJ • -ar Laws, • 1 
§S 1-3. 
This i. consistent with the argument made here that 
exhans . . id except in the narrow circumstances 
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recognized in Brumley, a threshold constitutional issue that 
could not be avoided by any twist or turn the case may take 
before the Tax Commission, and that the statutory refund 
procedure is controlling. Timely claims, filed pursuant to 
that section, must be filed by each individual taxpayer 
claiming a refund. 
Brumley did not recognize any right for the district 
court to entertain tax refunds independent of the statutory 
refund mechanisms set forth by the legislature. Following 
the Brumley decision individual claims were filed and 
processed by the Tax Commission. Brumley, at 799. 
The sovereign immunity argument set forth above was not 
raised as a defense to the maintenance of a class action in 
Brumley. To that extent, Brumley did not address, let alone 
decide this issue. Utah R. Civ. P. 23, which provides the 
procedural mechanism for pursuing a class action in the 
district court, is not a substantive remedy. It was not 
adopted by the Legislature, but is a procedural rule adopted 
by this Court. 
The Legislative branch has established Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-110 as the vehicle to obtain a sales tax refund. That 
section requires the person paying the tax to file a claim 
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with the Tax Commission wiLiu-ii 
payment. Utah Code Ann. § -9-12-::i« r .?,J-V . 
Th^ :v I-IIIM," t I "r ms^l v^ ir* recugnizc- I I1*.1 pi '"fikit*^  ''I rpecjLic 
statutory procedures set forth by the- Legislature. Utah R. 
', . i - outL:;.*^ -he app] icat . : . y i^ the Rules of 
Civil Procedure in court, states: 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling 01 order 
of an administrative board or agency. These rules 
shall apply to the practice and procedure in 
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, 
ruling or other action of an administrative board 
or agency, except insofar as the specific 
statutory procedure in connection with any such 
appea] or review is i n conflict with these rules. 
Class Action lawsuits for tax refunds filed directly ^^ 
d i s t i :i irt con u : t ar: e c l e a r l y :i n conf . i,- .-* . :. tie t a x code , 
the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Rulemak•- - - -t. 
None of these statutes provide for class actions All of 
t h e s e ^ i " •:*" ' *• *;<.-• : ' i - • . • < . 
the Legislature tor review of assessments, decisions, ~i 
These statutes, consisterr wj\-)-- r<;e Constitution, 
i: eqi i ] i: e ai i : . . » », . * v exhaust 
administrative remedies in
 matters invo] A r:i i lg ta xati 03 :i 
Under the Rulemaking Act which governs it.in matter, an 
"*: r---r: ' .<
 : . /e'i ; iew of 
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the decision, and remand if appropriate to the agency for 
further fact-finding. See, Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-12.1. 
Since this action is brought under the Rulemaking Act, to 
challenge a rule, certification of a class would not be 
necessary. Any determination regarding the validity of the 
rule would bind the Commission and be applicable to all 
taxpayers. Therefore, there is no need to certify a class 
in such an action. 
Certifying a class action under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure would conflict with the statutory procedure to 
obtain a refund established by the Legislature under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-110. That section requires each taxpayer 
to file a claim within 3 years of the date the tax was paid. 
Several states have considered whether a class action 
is an appropriate mechanism for pursuing a tax refund. In 
Lacey Nursing Center, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 905 P.2d 338 
(Wash. 1995), a group of nursing homes attempted to pursue 
excise tax refunds as a class. After the district court 
certified the class, the Supreme Court of Washington 
reversed. The court held that the class action mechanism 
was inconsistent with statutory requirements for pursuing 
tax refunds. Id. at 343. It further noted that the refund 
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statute, uis a conditional, r .--*•-~; I i ^  ' M \ n r t » j m i 
immunity m1ie righ" • bring excise tax refund suits 
by statute •.; .-. 3 4 • _ . Mta t i. o n om i 11 e d. ) 
o;.;:ii i a i . ;. . i:o ...upreme Court or Arkansas addressed the 
issue in Dep't of Finance and Admin 3taton, 9 
804 (Ark. 1^96 i Staton, •= taxpayer sought a sales t.-i\ 
-^f < ; el f .'.[o.t:;: r 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, r.'-e Arkansas court held 
i . •_ _ ;. , . jntcit^/u .* :iass action 
against the state in a manner not prescribed t- ^Mt-
I_d. at 8 05. That court emphasized the important policy 
considrra*- r<-i r 
the state and financial planninq ability. Id. .r «ou- : (- . 
> have reached sinii] ar 
resuit;s . See , Lilian v. Commw. of Pennsy 1 vania, 3 54 A. 2d 
fix . ...:; . •_ • , Ellsworth Freight Lines, Inc. v. State Tax 
Common of Missour i , 651 S.W.2u i i .ace , . 
Private Truck Council of America, j/l :..K Ji V7 8 iCa 9 H ~ ) ; 
Wisconsin. Dep't of Revenue v. 
1995 . Hooks v. Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 289 
In re County Tax Levy, 374 N.W.2d 
11 
235 (Neb. 1985). Class actions seeking tax refunds should 
not be allowed unless specifically provided by the 
Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter is of the type regularly dealt with by the 
Tax Commission, well within the purview of the Tax 
Commission's expertise and authority. The power to consider 
issues of this nature is reserved to the Tax Commission 
under the Utah Constitution. The district court's role, set 
forth by statute, is to review these determinations, "as 
provided by the legislature." 
Any issues regarding a claim for refund are not germane 
to whether Plaintiffs should be required to exhaust when 
challenging Tax Commission rules. The statutes by which the 
legislature has waived the state's immunity from suit for 
tax refund purposes are the exclusive remedy for obtaining a 
tax refund. If characterized as a declaratory action to 
restrain the collection of tax, the action is barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-704. The State has not waived immunity to 
permit the maintenance of a class action seeking a tax 
refund. 
The Court of Appeals erred in excusing exhaustion. 
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Been u H P f I 1 i in nt i f ( f i i I in i I s<1i 111," I i dm i MI »l i Hi iire 
remedies, the district court lacks jurisdiction to considei 
these ibbuei in I h I in I in il ULU'L I1 u these reasons, the 
Tax Commission respectfully requests that the decision oi 
the Court of Appeals be reversed. 
DATED this I da\ t Kibtmn • M M } . 
tark L. Snelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
cJicir  . n e l
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